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ABSTRACT:  The relatively swift negotiation and implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CCD) invites us to consider what 
came before it and what may follow. This article reviews experience with the creation of cultural “shelf 
space” under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) through the use of a cultural 
“exception” and how this experience served as an important impetus for Canadian leadership in the 
negotiation and conclusion of the CCD. The article goes on to consider the CCD’s potential impact as 
custom and process in the creation of cultural “shelf space” internationally.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article is about the creation of “shelf space”. The term “shelf space” is used in colloquial 
English to denote the making of room for desirable things that one might want close at hand. 
The concept is an inviting one because it implies ready access to something that is otherwise 
hard to obtain. 
 
In this instance, the term “shelf space” is used metaphorically to refer to a key debate arising in 
the intersection between international trade regulation and cultural protection. That debate is 
about making room for a variety of cultural products. The reason for doing so is relatively clear. 
Some cultural products would not survive if disciplines on free trade were to prevail in every 
instance. There would be a loss of cultural diversity. Creating “shelf space” is therefore about 
efforts to protect and promote cultural pluralism, and more generally, about the loss humanity 
would suffer in cultural effacement if these efforts did not take place.  
 
The term “shelf space” is one that gained popularity in Canada in the late 1980s after Canada 
sought a measure of protection for Canadian culture in its free trade agreement with the United 
States of 1988.2 This “cultural exception” was later carried over into the North American Free 
Trade Agreement of 1994.3 
 
This article argues that the express exception for Canadian culture eventually embodied in 
NAFTA Art. 2106 was never formally invoked and instead served as a kind of “marker”, or 
symbol, for cultural protection – with important consequences. One was that the wording of the 
exception tended to focus debate about culture on a single legal provision, as if it possessed a 
talismanic quality. Once the exception was circumvented, however, it was exposed as having 
little real legal value. The second consequence was that the attention paid to the exception 
tended to highlight its strict terms. As a result, other sources of obligation in the field of 
cultural protection were neglected. The third consequence was that the exception itself was 
never formally invoked and was therefore something that could be regarded either negatively or 
positively. The outcome was ambiguity but also space within which to express a distinct voice. 
 
The article also argues that the experience with a formal, defined exception for culture - far 
from being a failure – served as an impetus for Canadian leadership in the negotiation and 
conclusion of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (CCD)4 and may well shape the way in which the CCD is interpreted as a 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor and Canadian Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, 
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7, email: ccarmody@uwo.ca. I would like to thank the Asian Centre for WTO & International 
Health Law for their generous invitation to present this paper June 28, 2007, and Rebecca Ma and Ryan Brown for their research 
assistance. 
2 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). 
3 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). 
4 45 I.L.M. 269 (2006). 
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conventional and customary source of international law in the future. The CCD is similarly 
ambiguous, but it must be considered alongside the development of customary international law 
in the area and contains a number of process mechanisms that may permit the ambiguity to be 
shaped creatively over time. In that sense, the CCD can be seen as an attempt to secure cultural 
“shelf space” internationally. 
 
This article is therefore about many things. It is, first and foremost, about the idea of shelf 
space and Canada’s efforts to protect its culture(s) internationally. Yet it is also about rights and 
obligations in relation to culture, and about the vital need for balance. That balance is unlikely 
to be achieved once and for all, particularly vis-à-vis culture, and so the CCD offers ways for 
the balance to be struck on an ad hoc basis by pointing to custom and process, thereby allowing 
for the emergence of shelf space. The outcome should be a more satisfying reconciliation of 
culture and trade disciplines.  
 
2. CANADA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CULTURAL PROTECTION 
 
As many people who write in the field of cultural protection have observed, culture is difficult 
to discuss because of the problem of definition. Just what is “culture”, and how far do its 
boundaries extend?5 There have been attempts to provide a definition in international 
instruments, but even here the plurality of definitions should alert us to the fact that culture is 
an exceedingly vague and nebulous concept, and therefore legally speaking, something to be 
contested. A kind of frustration easily sets in. Culture is maddening in its formlessness, and yet 
like the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland, somehow it always manages to leave its smile 
behind. 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948 speaks of each person having 
“the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development 
of his personality”6 and the right “freely to participate in the cultural life of the community”.7 
Other rights expressed in the Declaration can be regarded as underpinning these entitlements.8 
These were later repeated, and to some extent amplified, in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of December 1966.9 Nevertheless, the Universal 
Declaration and the ICESCR are broad-brush statements about many things. They do not say 
much about what the content of culture is, or about cultural diversity. 
 
Instead, we have to look to UNESCO-sponsored documents such as the non-binding 
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation of 196610 which states that: 
 
1) “each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and 
preserved” 
2) “every people has the right and the duty to develop its culture” 
3) “in their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert 
on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage of mankind” 
                                                 
5 John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exemption from NAFTA – It’s Parameters, 23 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 165 (1997) (discussing the 
problem of definition in relation to culture and cultural industries). 
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 22. 
7 Ibid., Art. 27. 
8 See, for instance, the right expressed in Art. 27(2) of the Universal Declaration to the protection of moral and material interests in 
intellectual property and the duty expressed in Art. 29(1) that “[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.” 
9 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). See for instance Art. 15(1) concerning the right “to take part in cultural life” and “to benefit from the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” 
10 Nov. 4, 1966, UNESCO Standard-Setting Instruments, IV.C. (1994). 
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There are several notable aspects about culture in these statements. First, cultures are regarded 
as monolithic in their entitlement to dignity, respect and preservation. This runs contrary to the 
malleable nature of culture but was probably inevitable given the constraints of legal drafting. 
Second, cultures are inherent in a “people”, something which undercuts the state-centered 
nature of the international system. In UNESCO’s formulation, a people might have a culture 
distinct from that of the dominant national culture they are found within. Third, people have 
both rights and obligations in relation to cultural development, implicitly underlining the need 
for legal balance in cultural protection. No right is enjoyed absolutely. Fourth, culture is biotic, 
or in other words, something that is evolutionary and constantly changing.    
 
Each of these characteristics identified in the UNESCO Declaration hints at how difficult it is 
to protect and promote culture, and is undoubtedly the reason why subsequent international 
instruments in the field of cultural protection have aimed at the concrete. These include the 
Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972,11 the 
Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage of 2001,12 the Convention for 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 200313 and the Declaration concerning 
the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage of 2003.14 The instruments approach the 
question of cultural protection from different angles, yet they offer little in the way of 
protecting culture comprehensively, or in other words, as a living good. 
 
More recently, some efforts have been made to get more directly at the complex issue of culture 
and cultural diversity, and this resulted in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of 
2001 and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (CCD) of 2005. The Declaration held cultural diversity to be “the common 
heritage of humanity”, “as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature” and 
“indissociable from respect for the dignity of the individual”.15 The Declaration was 
championed by France and Canada and it is Canadian experience with cultural protection that 
will be focused on here to explain the subsequent shape of the CCD. 
 
Canada has always had difficulty distinguishing itself culturally from its more powerful 
neighbors. Despite the fact that it enjoys a high standard of living and sits at or near the top of 
the U.N.’s Human Development Index, its ability to define, and therefore to project, what is 
distinctively Canadian has been weak and subject to constant challenge. Canadian federal 
government intervention in the cultural sector began as early as 1849 with the establishment of 
a postal subsidy for newspapers, magazines and books, but in the years prior to the 1920s was 
limited to heritage institutions such as museums and archives, and to the regulation of wireless 
communication. In the 1920s and 1930s federal government involvement expanded to include 
broadcasting and the protection of copyright, arts and film.16 Later in the 1940s and 1950s the 
federal government sponsored the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, 
Letters and Sciences, the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, the establishment of the Canada 
Council to fund the humanities, arts and social sciences, and founding of the National Library. 
 
The 1960s witnessed the consolidation of the national museums and the establishment of new 
                                                 
11 11 I.L.M. 1358 (1972). 
12 41 I.L.M. 40 (2002). 
13 UNESCO Doc.MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14 (2003). 
14 UNESCO General Congress, 32nd Sess. (adopted by consensus Oct. 17, 2003). 
15 41 I.L.M. 57. See Art. 1 and introductory note by UNESCO Director-General Koїchiro Matsuura. 
16 This synopsis of Canadian cultural policy in this paragraph and the three that succeed it has been adapted from M. Sharon Jeannotte, 
“Timeline of Canadian Federal Cultural Policy – 1849-2005” available at www. http://culturescope.ca/policy-timeline (visited June 4, 
2007). 
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federal cultural institutions, such as the National Arts Centre, as well as the creation of a de 
facto department of culture in the form of the Department of the Secretary of State. In the 
1970s, the federal government began to expand its definition of “culture” to include 
bilingualism, biculturalism and multiculturalism. Canada is a historically bilingual country of 
English- and French-speaking peoples, but it also possesses a heritage of First Nations Peoples 
and more recently has been the destination for immigrants around the world. These changes 
required government in the 1960s and 1970s to confront, and try to define more directly, what 
Canadian culture was. Thus, the government intensified its focus on supporting Canadian 
cultural content and on the status of the artist, as well as taking the first steps to understand the 
impact of digital technologies on culture and society. 
 
By the 1980s federal responsibility for cultural policy had been transferred, at least partially, to 
the federal Minister of Communications and efforts began to expand broadcasting and 
communications to Aboriginal communities in Northern Canada. During this period, a number 
of major cultural policy reviews were conducted. Canada also continued its membership in 
UNESCO, an organization it had been active in since 1945. 
  
The 1990s were years of major change in federal cultural policy. Most of the legislation and 
responsibilities for cultural policy were transferred to the new Department of Canadian 
Heritage in 1993, and during this period the cultural sector experienced deep budget cuts as a 
result of a federal government-wide Program Review. At the same time, international pressures 
prompted major reviews of culture and trade and the establishment of culture as the “third 
pillar” of foreign policy. New technologies were also beginning to have a significant impact on 
the cultural sector, leading to changes in the Copyright Act, the Broadcasting Act, and licensing 
by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) of various 
new broadcasting services.  
 
In the first decade of the new century, federal cultural policies continue to grapple with the 
many challenges of technological change, while dealing with new demands on both the 
domestic and international scene. Sharing of cultural content on the internet led to further re-
examination of the Copyright Act, to the formation of federally sponsored rights collectives, 
and to Canadian governments’ moving aggressively to deliver services and content online.17 On 
the international front, Canada became a leader in the development of the UNESCO CCD.  
 
Despite these developments, the reality is that the average Canadian knows very little of the 
intricate legal apparatus that shapes the culture of the world in which they live. Life is different in 
Canada than it is in many countries, and it is identifiably so for many reasons, whether in the 
form of mandated Canadian content on the radio or television, the hefty annual subsidies 
bestowed to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board, the “Can Lit” 
that makes its ways into Canadian bookstores, and so forth. This web of cultural regulation is 
virtually invisible inside Canada. 
 
The product of this cultural machinery also works in an opaque - and even hypocritical - way. 
Canada’s major cities are convenient stand-ins for major American and European cities and 
dozens of Hollywood film crews work on location in Canada each year. Canadian cultural icons 
like Margaret Atwood, Diana Krall, Avril Lavigne, Céline Dion, Atom Egoyan, Keanu Reeves, 
The Tragically Hip, Our Lady Peace, Sarah McLachlin and Gordon Pinsett continue to make 
                                                 
17 A collective society is an organization that administers the rights of several copyright owners. It can grant permission to use their 
works and set the conditions for that use. Collective administration is widespread in Canada, particularly for music performance 
rights, reprography rights and mechanical reproduction rights. Some collective societies are affiliated with foreign societies; this 
allows them to represent foreign copyright owners as well. See Copyright Board of Canada, www.cb-cda.gc.ca/societies/index-e.html. 
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their way on the world stage, but in the United States and elsewhere they generally do so without 
being identifiably Canadian. The television program Anne of Avonlea is a hit in Iran, the Cirque 
du Soleil continues to draw large crowds in Las Vegas, and Statistics Canada reports that 
Canadian cultural exports are higher than ever before, yet one would never know this speaking to 
most Canadians. A sense of cultural poverty subsists. Located as we are next to the largest and 
most dynamic cultural market in the world, it is easy for Canadians to see ourselves as under 
threat, hence the critical need to create “shelf space”. 
 
The term “shelf space” is something that has entered into the Canadian cultural vocabulary in the 
last few decades to signify the making of conscious efforts to provide Canadian cultural content 
in a crowded and competitive world. It is not officially defined. Rather, shelf space is a term that 
has been used by both official and non-governmental sources to refer to the foregoing set of 
ideas. A recent statement from the Department of Canadian Heritage about the current state of 
film and video broadcasting in Canada observed: 
 
With strong backing from the Broadcasting Act and under licensing rules set out 
by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC), "shelf space" is guaranteed for Canadian content, including Canadian 
feature films. But in making the jump from the small screen to the big screen, 
Canadian filmmakers find themselves in a cinema market which has unfolded in 
a decidedly non-Canadian setting: only 2 percent of box office revenues in 
Canada are earned from Canadian movies.18  
 
Of course, looked at from the perspective that this statement implies – one which recognizes the 
defensive and offensive aspects of Canadian cultural policy – one can understand something of 
the frustration felt by the United States about what has happened in recent years. Cultural 
protection is unfair, unless one buys the claim that protective measures are actually necessary to 
counter the still greater unfairness of a U.S. cultural industry whose returns to scale allow it to 
dominate global markets. 
 
These were precisely the claims that Canada’s federal government had to answer to in negotiating 
a free trade agreement with the United States in the late 1980s. As is generally known, the 
“cultural exception” or “exemption” came into being in the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement of 1988. In his memoirs Canada’s Ambassador to the United States at that time, Allan 
Gotlieb, relates that the exception came about at the last minute as a sop to cultural interests and 
was the subject of furious negotiation, hence the tempered and contradictory nature of the final 
result.19 Article 2005 of the agreement reads as follows: 
                                                 
18 See Department of Canadian Heritage, Our Story in Pictures: Film and Video Broadcasting, available at www.pch.gc.ca/pc-
ch/mindep/misc/culture/htm/3.htm. 
19 Gotlieb’s diary contains the following entry: “October 4, 1987: Around 9 p.m., just as we were nearing the end [of the free trade 
negotiations], we got into a furious argument with [James] Baker and [Clayton] Yeutter about the cultural exemption. They wanted 
some language that was totally inconsistent with the exemption, but after sharp words, bitter debate and acrimony, we settled on a 
formula that basically recognizes the U.S. right to retaliate for cultural measures in certain circumstances. A tempest in a teapot that 
will, alas, lead to a genuine tempest back home when people read the words and ask, “Was culture on the table?” It wasn’t. All we did 
was recognize that the United States reserves its rights. But that fine point will be difficult to get across.” ALLAN GOTLIEB, THE 
WASHINGTON DIARIES 1981-1989 494-495 (2006). 
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Article 2005: Cultural Industries 
 
1. Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement, except 
as specifically provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of 
Article 1607 (divestiture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007 
of this Chapter. 
 
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take 
measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have 
been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1.20 
 
As Gotlieb predicted at the time, public reaction to this provision in Canada was mixed – and 
rightly so. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “exception” as “something that is excluded from a 
rule’s operation”, but as Gotlieb himself points out, the United States had reserved its rights in 
Art. 2005(2) and the reservation went to the very heart of the matter. There can be no true 
exception where a right to retaliate continues to exist. Consequently, the perception lingered that 
“culture was not in the agreement, but neither was it left out.”21 
 
Despite such qualms the exception was carried over, with little amendment, into the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) five years later as NAFTA Art. 2106.22 It did not 
apply directly to Mexico. For its part, the United States continued to maintain that if Canada 
wanted to protect culture “it had to pay for it”.23 
 
A formal exception for cultural protection in NAFTA tended to emphasize certain things. One of 
these was the very fact of a formal exception, something which could be raised in law to derogate 
from liberalization obligations. There was a kind of talismanic quality to it, as though the 
exception was all that was keeping Canadians safe from the hordes south of the border. That was 
plainly not the case. 
 
The second thing that Art. 2106 tended to do was to focus all attention on the terms of the 
exception itself as opposed to seeing the exception as a manifestation of an internationally 
recognized norm of cultural diversity. By the mid-1990s a number of international instruments 
articulated rights concerning culture, yet few efforts were made to link it to those norms. The 
exception was construed as “all”.  
                                                 
20 The term “cultural industries” was given the following definition: “cultural industry means an enterprise engaged in any of the 
following activities: a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or newspapers in print or machine 
readable form but not including the sole activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing, b) the production, distribution, sale or 
exhibition of film or video recordings, c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music recordings, d) the 
publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or machine readable form, or e) radio communication in which the transmissions are 
intended for direct reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television broadcasting undertakings and all 
satellite programming and broadcast network services.” 
21 The quote paraphrases Graham Carr, who observed in 1991 that “culture may be exempted from the agreement, but ‘it most 
assuredly has not been left out’”. Graham Carr, Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of Culture: An International 
Perspective, 6 CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 7-8 (June 1991). John Rogosta also describes the ambiguity of the situation as 
follows: “The system to date actually has worked quite well to avoid disputes on this issue and on culture in general, because there has 
been a quiet status quo or a sort of ‘No Man’s Land’”. Both governments have disagreed about exactly how the cultural terms should 
be interpreted, but both governments have been loathe to really force the issue.” John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exemption 
from NAFTA – It’s Parameters, 23 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 165, 169 (1997).   
22 The text of NAFTA Annex 2106 reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between Canada and 
the United States, any measure adopted or maintained with respect to cultural industries, except as specifically provided in Article 302 
(Market Access - Tariff Elimination), and any measure of equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed under this 
Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions of the Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement. The rights and 
obligations between Canada and any other Party with respect to such measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada 
and the United States.” The definition of “cultural industries” is the same as in the previous footnote. 
23 See John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exemption from NAFTA – It’s Parameters, 23 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 165, 167 (1997). 
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The third thing that a formal exception did was to emphasize the uniqueness of the exception, 
when in fact there were at the time several other international economic instruments with cultural 
protection clauses in them, most notably the EC treaties, and that these could be jointly regarded 
as embodying custom.24 It was as if Canada had a first on its hands – a confirmation of its 
uniqueness and something to assert its distinctiveness about – when that was far from true. 
 
The Periodicals dispute between Canada and the United States in the World Trade Organization 
in 1996 laid to rest any illusions that Canadians may have had about the validity of the 
exception.25 The dispute itself involved restrictions on split-run advertising that effectively 
prohibited American publications from launching Canadian editions with a mix of Canadian and 
recycled U.S. editorial content. The WTO Appellate Body agreed that Canadian and U.S. 
periodicals were “directly competitive or substitutable products” notwithstanding the difference 
in content and therefore subject to the non-discrimination obligation in GATT Art. III:2, second 
sentence. From an economic perspective, the panel had observed that “cultural identity was not at 
issue” and the Appellate Body did nothing to contradict this view.26 NAFTA Art. 2106 was not 
invoked in the dispute, probably because of uncertainty about whether a NAFTA provision could 
be successfully applied under the WTO Agreement, but the case was nevertheless regarded as a 
kind of cultural Waterloo for Canada, a loss. 
 
In the wake of Periodicals the idea of a formal cultural exception to NAFTA or WTO obligations 
lost much of its attraction. In 1998 an advisory panel on cultural policy to Canada’s Minister of 
International Trade concluded that the exception was not working and that therefore the country 
should move in the direction of developing a multilateral instrument with other like-minded 
countries. This led to Canada’s championing of efforts in this direction at UNESCO beginning 
with the Declaration on Cultural Diversity in December 200127 and promoting the eventual 
conclusion of the CCD in October 2005. 
 
The swift conclusion of the CCD was assisted by the absence of the United States from UNESCO 
for at least part of its drafting, but it also has to be regarded as part of a larger diplomatic effort by 
Canada in the post-Cold War period.28 In this context Canada championed the conclusion of the 
                                                 
24 See Delia Ferri, EU Participation in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions: Some Constitutional Remarks, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 3/2005. Ferri observes that the original 
European treaties “did not recognize any legal area for actions in favour of culture, but the interaction between culture and European 
Union law is of course more long-standing.” See Ferri, supra, at 11. See also RACHEL CRAUFURD SMITH, CULTURE AND EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW (2004). 
25 Bruce Jamieson, Trade Liberalization: Culture, Identity and Social Cohesion 125-129 (2000) available at 
www.international.gc.ca/eet/pdf/06-en.pdf referring to the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade 
(SAGIT) position paper Strategies for Culture and Trade: Canadian Culture in a Global World (Feb. 1999).  
26 Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R, para. 5.45 (March 14, 1997). 
27 45 I.L.M. 269 (2006). 
28 Jennifer Welsh summarized the rationale behind Canada’s position as follows: 
 
“There is also a more hard-headed case against conceiving of foreign policy solely as trade policy. While 
Hart’s argument may have had some resonance during the 1990s, when the west had won the Cold War and 
was enjoying an unprecedented level of security, the post-9/11 era presents a host of new threats to 
international peace and security for all states that make up the so-called west. Canadian foreign policy must 
actively address these threats, in collaboration with other actors on the international stage. In short, Canada 
must do more than buy and sell. It must contribute to the creation of new rules and structures to manage 
global problems. It must build capacity in other members of the international community so that they too can 
contribute, economically and politically. And if the Canadian view on how to address new threats and 
problems differs from that of the United States, as it did during the recent campaign to unseat Saddam 
Hussein, it must be willing to go its own way.  
 
Above all, Canadian policy-makers must dare to entertain the notion that the United States will not be the 
world’s only superpower forever. This is not to invite decline or ruin for the US. Rather, it is to do some prudent 
long-term planning. Canada’s interests are best served if future superpowers are firmly embedded in 
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Ottawa Landmines Convention in 1998,29 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 
1999,30 and forwarded documents such as The Responsibility to Protect, all initiatives that could 
be seen as distinctive Canadian contributions to the rule of international law. All were laudable, if 
somewhat visionary, undertakings. They evidently staked out for Canada a position very different 
from that of the United States, differentiating us from our southern neighbour in our commitment 
to multilateralism and speaking to an idealized vision of international relations that many 
countries, particularly smaller ones, could rally around.  
 
The outcome of all of this diplomatic effort has borne mixed fruit. All of the above mentioned 
conventions have entered into force with remarkable speed. The pattern could be regarded as a 
confirmation of the essential correctness of Canada’s position. At the same time, all have also 
come into existence in the face of U.S. opposition and it remains to be seen how successful they 
can be given the influence that the most powerful nation in the world continues to exert.  
 
It should also be noted that Canada has not placed all of its cultural protection “eggs” in the 
multilateral basket. Notwithstanding the Periodicals debacle, Canada has continued to conclude 
bilateral free trade and foreign investment protection agreements with cultural protection clauses 
in them.31 It is against this background that a realistic assessment of the CCD needs to be 
conducted. 
 
3. THE CCD AS A REALITY 
 
Rights and obligations are the foundation of any modern system of law, including international 
law, and so it seems entirely appropriate to focus on their relationship under the CCD as a 
means of conducting the analysis.32 
 
In international law states may assume obligations that are either conventional or customary in 
origin. In addition, they may assume obligations to one other country bilaterally, to the 
international community as a whole (erga omnes) or to a subset thereof (erga omnes partes).33 
Once assumed, the tenor of obligations may be either reciprocal, interdependent or integral 
depending on the consequences arising from their breach.34  
                                                                                                                                                 
international institutions and have been “socialized” to co-operate with others in the management of common 
problems.” 
 
See Jennifer M. Welsh,  Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power, 16:4 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 13 (2004). 
29 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997). 
30 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). 
31 Canada’s bilateral free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica and Israel all contain cultural protection clauses, as do many of 
Canada’s bilateral foreign investment protection agreements. A list is available at  www.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/fipa_list-en.asp.  
32 The correspondence of rights and obligations as a hallmark of international law has been recognized in many instances. It is implicit 
in the International Law Commission’s Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, which the U.N. General Assembly 
“commended to the continuing attention of [U.N.] Member States”, G.A. Res. 375 (IV) (Dec. 6 1949). It has also been pivotal in a 
number of disputes before the International Court of Justice: see Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
(Qatar v. Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), [1994] ICJ Rep. 12 (discussing the fact that a document between the parties “was 
not a simple record of a meeting” but something which “enumerat[ed] the commitments to which the Parties have consented. They 
thus create rights and obligations in international law for the Parties.”  (emphasis added)). For a case where the absence of rights and 
obligations precluded the creation of an international agreement see Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), [1952] ICJ Rep. 93. It 
is also true that international obligations may be incurred without any corresponding rights: see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 
[1974] ICJ Rep. 253.  
33 This is recognized in Arts. 38(1)(a)-(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by virtue of the Barcelona Traction 
Case [1970], I.C.J. Rep. 4. Article 33(1) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility recognize that 
obligations may be owed either bilaterally or collectively, and that in the latter case, collective obligations may be owed to the 
international community as a whole or to a subset thereof. Furthermore, Art. 33(2) makes clear that the ASR are without prejudice to 
“any right … which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State.”  Thus, states may owe obligations to individuals, 
groups and affiliations.  
34 The distinction between reciprocal, interdependent and integral obligations originates in the work of Gerald Fitzmaurice on the law 
of treaties in the 1950s.  Fitzmaurice posited that bilateral treaty obligations would be bilateral and that multilateral treaties could be 
 9 
 
 
The position of international law with respect to rights is somewhat different. The classical 
conception of rights is that states are free to do what is not otherwise prohibited,35 although this 
conception has changed in recent years with the proliferation of international law, the work of 
international organizations, and the need to persistently object to emerging customary 
developments. 
 
In general we tend to think of rights and obligations as correspondent, but what is immediately 
noteworthy about the CCD is that it is primarily a regime of rights. Thus, in CCD Art. 5(1) 
“countries have the sovereign right to formulate and implement their cultural policies and to 
protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions”, in CCD Art. 6(1) countries “may adopt 
measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions within [their] 
territory”, and in CCD Art. 8(2) a country has the right to “take all appropriate measures to 
protect and preserve cultural expressions” where “cultural expressions on its territory are at risk 
of extinction, under serious threat, or otherwise in need of urgent safeguarding.” 
 
Obligations in the CCD are less well-defined. Many are exceedingly vague and inconsequential. 
Thus, in CCD Art. 12 it states that “[p]arties shall endeavour to strengthen their bilateral, regional 
and international cooperation” regarding the promotion of cultural diversity – in essence, a best 
efforts approach. In CCD Art. 18 an International Fund for Cultural Diversity is established, but 
under Art. 18(7) countries shall merely “endeavour to provide voluntary contributions”. Dispute 
settlement under the CCD is optional and by means of conciliation.36  
 
The particular orientation in the CCD has to be contrasted with the WTO legal order, which is 
primarily a law of obligations. Under the WTO Agreement the chief obligation is GATT Art. 
I:1, the MFN obligation, which provides in relevant part that: 
 
“any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like products originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other contracting parties.” 
 
MFN is pivotal in the sense that it does away with conditionality and any attempt at preference. 
Substantively speaking, it creates a level playing field. MFN’s requirement of non-
discrimination reflects through the rest of the treaty’s text. 
 
However, MFN does much more than establish a norm of non-discrimination. By virtue of its 
broad wording it creates a legal regime which is generalized and plenary. Thus, in order to 
establish wrongdoing country needs only demonstrate that another country has failed to observe 
                                                                                                                                                 
composed of obligations that were either bilateral (or what he termed “reciprocal”), interdependent (conditional upon the performance 
of other parties) or integral (unconditional) in character. See G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/115 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1958 II) at 20. Fitzmaurice’s ideas later served as the basis for the 
scheme of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). While Fitzmaurice’s typology is neat and therefore 
attractive, it overlooks the fact that a single treaty may be composed of different types of obligations and therefore more recent work, 
like the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, has rightly focused on the nature of obligations. JAMES 
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND 
COMMENTARIES 233 (2002). 
35 The classic statement of international law is taken from The Case of the S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 at 15 (1927) where the 
PCIJ stated: “Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of 
discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules … .”  
36 See CCD Art. 25(3). 
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its obligations. A presumption of injury operates; there is no requirement of proof.37 There are 
other features of the law in this mode too. Because WTO law is generalized, it is in some sense 
constitutive and it deals essentially with public property, a property that arises when a single 
WTO member makes a commitment that is extended “immediately and unconditionally” to the 
rest of the WTO membership.38 The nature of justice is therefore different from what we might 
normally expect. Rather than concern itself with who has been harmed by wrongdoing, the 
treaty recognizes that in the dense pattern of interaction such obligations give rise to, all 
countries are injured and so the aim of justice is to re-establish the distribution of expectations, 
nothing more. 
 
At the same time, it is also evident there is something else that is taking place in WTO law. 
This is what can be referred to as the adjustment to “realities”. The WTO’s legal order may be 
predominantly about obligations, but there is also something else that is occurring at the same 
time: this is more evidently a law of rights. What is being referred to here is the right of a 
country to do something – for instance, to invoke a safeguard or a countervailing or anti-
dumping duty – a right that can be exercised to deal with situations that are actually 
encountered in the course of trade. These rights arise at different points in the treaty 
interstitially and present a stark contrast to the character of WTO law as a law of obligations. 
Where WTO law in the first mode is generalized and plenary, WTO law in this second mode is 
specialized and exceptional. Moreover, in most instances there is a need to demonstrate proof in 
order to exercise the right in question. Thus, many WTO disputes have been about whether a 
country has met the requisite evidentiary burden in order to invoke its rights.39 
 
There are substantive consequences to this distinction as well. The law of realities is more 
evidently contractual in the sense that a country’s invocation of its rights is more likely to be 
regarded as harming one other country, and so the law’s impulse subtly becomes more 
corrective. Countries seek to recover for harm done.40 The law is specific and retrospective, and 
naturally becomes concerned with “trade”. 
 
It is then possible to discern a substantive divide at the heart of the WTO Agreement, a divide 
which aligns the law of expectation-obligation-distribution on one side against the law of 
reality-right-correction on the other. From such an identification it is possible to observe what 
Philip Allott has referred to as “idea complexes”41, or offsetting clusters of norms which 
function as the basis of a legal order. Together, they animate the workings of the WTO 
                                                 
37 See Art. 3.8 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, which provides that “In cases where there is an infringement of the 
obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or 
impairment.”  
38 See discussion in Chios Carmody, WTO Obligations as Collective, 17:2 E.J.I.L. 419, 425-431 (2006).  
39 See for example Safeguards Agreement Art. 6 (provisional safeguard possible “in critical circumstances” and pursuant to a 
preliminary determination based on “clear evidence”), Subsidies Agreement Art. 17.1(b) (provisional measures possible where 
preliminary affirmative determination that “subsidy exists and that there is injury to a domestic industry”) and Antidumping 
Agreement Art. 7.1(ii) (provisional measures possible where preliminary affirmative determination of “dumping and consequent 
injury to a domestic industry”). See also the standard for threatened injury: SAF Art. 4.2(a), SCM Arts. 15.7-8; AD Art. 3.7. In this 
respect see also U.S. – Lamb Safeguards, WT/DS177,178/AB/R, para. 125 (May 1, 2001) (where in interpreting the phrase “threat of 
serious injury” the Appellate Body emphasized the phrase “clearly imminent” which it considered to mean “that there must be a high 
degree of likelihood that the anticipated serious injury will materialize in the very near future.”). 
40 Compensation is only available as a voluntary remedy and temporarily until the return to compliance: see DSU Art. 22.2. As of early 
2007 compensation had only been negotiated in one case under the WTO DSU, United States – Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000). For commentary see Bernard O’Connor & Margareta Djordjevic, Practical Aspects of Monetary 
Compensation: The U.S. Copyright Case 8:1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 127 (2005). However, there are also other indications in the WTO 
Agreement of a subtle corrective impulse, as in, for instance, the requirement to “withdraw” a prohibited subsidy in Art. 7.8 of the 
WTO Subsidies Agreement (“the Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
effects or shall withdraw the subsidy.”). This provision was at issue in Australia – Subsidies provided to Producers and Exporters of 
Automotive Leather (21.5), WT/DS126/RW (Jan. 21, 2000). 
41 PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS 47 (2002). 
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Agreement. 
 
The structure of rights and obligations in the WTO Agreement alternately constrains and 
enables national behaviour in important ways, and is given further momentum by the WTO’s 
binding system of dispute settlement.42 The obligations to resolve disputes in accordance with 
Art. 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding are “particularly important since they 
radiate on to all substantive obligations under the WTO.”43 This contrasts sharply with the non-
binding nature of dispute settlement under the CCD.  
 
The greater point to be taken away from the analysis is that this structure provides a substantive 
“balance” in the WTO Agreement. Panels and the Appellate Body have frequently referred to 
the idea of balance in WTO dispute settlement and attempted to link it to trade, but the truth is 
much more subtle.44 The treaty is an enforceable balance of rights and obligations, or if we are 
being totally honest, of obligations countered occasionally by rights. That balance tilts in one 
direction. 
 
In the CCD, by comparison, the balance tilts in the opposite direction. This is because, as 
noted, the treaty is primarily a law of rights, but also because those rights are relatively 
unconstrained. Unlike the WTO Agreement, rights under the CCD are lightly conditioned.45 
They do not have many requirements attached to their exercise. There also appears to be little 
awareness of mutuality, or the idea that rights must be exercised with rights of others in mind.  
 
Why is this the case? The answer is found in the history and consideration of what the CCD is 
designed to do. Many commentators have observed that the Convention came into being as a 
direct response to the perception that the WTO Agreement was too onerous.46 While the WTO 
Agreement may have been acceptable as a balance of trade obligations, when viewed in the 
larger context of international law, there was something “unbalanced” about it. A correction 
was required. The CCD aims to achieve this. The question then becomes how it might do so.  
 
4. THE CONVENTION AS CUSTOM 
 
The rapid conclusion and entry into force of the CCD suggests that many countries were 
dissatisfied with the WTO Agreement’s protection of culture and decided to do something 
about it en masse elsewhere. What has been engineered in the CCD is directly contrary to the 
dominant tendency in WTO law. That is the tendency to recognize the WTO Agreement as the 
pre-eminent source of the rights and obligations of WTO member countries, and to relegate of 
most other sources of international law to the status of interpretative assistance. To start then, 
                                                 
42 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 31 (2000). 
43 United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.94 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
44 See for instance U.S. – Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, p. 15 (Feb. 25, 1997) (referring to ATC Art. 6 as reflecting “carefully 
negotiated language ... which reflects an equally carefully drawn balance of rights and obligations of Members ... ."); U.S. – Hot-
Rolled Steel, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 102 (July 24, 2001) (“We, therefore, see paragraphs 2 and 5 of Annexes II of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement as reflecting a careful balance between the interests of investigating authorities and exporters.”); Brazil – Aircraft, 
WT/DS46/AB/R, para. 139 (Aug. 2, 1999) (“paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 27 contain a carefully negotiated balance of rights and 
obligations for developing country Members.”). 
45 Note, for instance, the way in which the following limitation on rights is phrased in CCD Art. 2(1): “No one may invoke the 
provisions of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights or guaranteed by international law or to limit the scope thereof.” This statement is followed, however, by CCD Art. 
2(2) entitled the “Principle of sovereignty” which provides that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to adopt measures and policies to protect and promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions within their territory.” 
46 See for instance Christoph Beat Graber, The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance to the WTO, 9 
J.I.E.L. 533 (2006). 
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the CCD may well fulfill such a secondary role. 
 
An example of this interpretative approach occurred in the U.S. – Shrimp case. In that case the 
Appellate Body used several sources of international law outside the WTO Agreement, 
including the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development and the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), to assist in interpreting the term 
“exhaustible natural resource”. Referring to those documents the Appellate Body was able to 
find that exhaustible natural resources included living biological resources such as sea turtles. 
This was important for the conclusion that the U.S. law at issue fell within the terms of the 
GATT Art. XX(g) general exception. The Appellate Body was therefore able to find that while 
the U.S. met the specific terms of the exception, its laws ran afoul only of the non-
discrimination requirements of GATT Art. XX’s preamble.  
 
While it is relatively clear that CCD obligations will not automatically override those of the 
WTO Agreement, the fact that they are given expression and formally confirmed in the CCD 
implies that the treaty may be used in the same way that the Rio Declaration or CITES was in 
Shrimp to bolster a culturally sensitive form of WTO interpretation. The Convention will give 
“color, texture and shading” to WTO obligations.47 It would indeed be strange if a treaty system 
which is prepared to protect biological diversity is not likewise prepared to be sensitive to 
human cultural diversity. 
 
There is, of course, the fact of the United States’ (and several other countries’) failure to sign 
on to the CCD, particularly in light of the panel’s statement in the GMOs dispute. There, the 
panel backed away from applying the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol on the basis that not all of 
the disputants had ratified the Protocol.48 Three observations may be made in this regard. First, 
the statement in GMOs was the statement of a panel, not the Appellate Body, which is superior 
in the WTO’s interpretative hierarchy. In any event, the panel in GMOs did not purport to over-
rule the Appellate Body in Shrimp. Second, rather than see the differences of opinion expressed 
in GMOs and Shrimp as a contest among diametrically opposed positions, it may be possible to 
reconcile them by reasoning that the WTO dispute settlement system is gradually developing a 
more nuanced approach to interpretative use of non-WTO norms. The difference in treatment 
exhibited in these cases could be regarded as consistent if one considers the case of CITES, 
where there was no record of non-ratification, with that of Cartagena, where there was. It 
should be noted that even in GMOs the panel was careful to qualify itself, observing: “the mere 
fact that one or more disputing parties are not parties to a convention does not necessarily mean 
that a convention cannot shed light on the meaning and scope of a treaty term to be 
interpreted.”49Third, the U.S. decision not to sign the CCD has consequences for the U.S. 
alone. The Convention could well serve as interpretative assistance in disputes among the 63 
states that have ratified as of July 2007.  
 
So far almost all of the substantive discussion concerning the CCD has paid attention to it as a 
treaty and to its relationship with other treaties, but the International Court’s dictum in the 
Nicaragua Case “that customary international law continues to exist and to apply separately 
from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an identical content”50 
leads to the question of the CCD’s potential impact as customary international law. This is a 
vital matter, not only because it is analytically more complete but because we may discern in 
                                                 
47 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 153 (Oct. 12, 1998). 
48 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, para. 7.94 (Sept. 29, 
2006). 
49 Ibid., para. 7.53. 
50 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), I.C.J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, 96.  
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the CCD something more calculated in its conclusion and entry into force - something which 
recalls Canada’s experience with the creation of “shelf space” under NAFTA.  
 
The classic requirements of custom are 1) consistent state practice and 2) opinio juris. These 
requirements have traditionally been problematic: in the case of practice because it is difficult 
to determine what the practice of states as a whole really is, and in the case of opinio juris 
because it is possibly even more difficult to determine whether states have acted out of a sense 
of legal obligation. The problems with custom have led to innumerable debates about what 
custom really is.51 
 
With the growing importance of international organizations like UNESCO, however, 
commentators have begun to observe the creation of “new” or “modern” custom.52 This new 
custom is “the product of a deliberative and deliberate process” in international organizations 
and is increasingly composed of “intertwined forms of treaty and custom.”53 Drawing on the 
work of Abraham and Antonia Chayes, José Alvarez has written that international organizations 
“encourage iterated cooperation; promote pooling of information, expertise and resources; 
reduce transaction costs, uncertainty and free-riders; and facilitate path dependencies.”54 In this 
way “IO venues make possible what would otherwise be increasingly difficult in a world of 
nearly 200 nation states: finding concrete, preferably written, evidence that virtually all states 
accept a rule as one of custom.”55 
 
The substantive results of this custom-as-process are noteworthy. IO constitutions and treaties 
“embedded in a broader institutional framework for elaboration … anticipate a continuous 
legislative enterprise by the political organs charged with interpretation. Such treaties, no less 
than environmental framework agreements, institutionalize change rather than reify stability.”56 
Their impact is catalytic. Alvarez observes: 
 
The distinction between hard treaty and soft law obligations is no longer as 
clear cut as it was, and it is no longer easy to tell whether states are complying 
because of a treaty or customary law obligation, or merely because they are 
dutifully following organizational expectations. This means as well that it is 
sometimes difficult to tell whether certain institutional products … impose 
obligations only for those who have notified particular treaties and are therefore 
a species of contractual obligation, or are general obligations on all and 
therefore a new phenomenon, namely, a species of international legislation.”57 
 
Perhaps the most important consequence of this “new” custom is that it subtly shifts the burden 
of proof. The onus is placed on any state attempting to deny the legal status of such rules.58 
 
UNESCO’s work on the CCD can be regarded as an illustration of the “new” custom in action. 
The work of an international organization is providing a shortcut to finding custom. The 
shortcut might be regarded as “a relatively more egalitarian approach to finding this source of 
                                                 
51 For discussion see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999); 
Andrew Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 708721 (April 2005). 
52 Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 A.J.I.L. 757 (2006); 
José Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 A.J.I.L. 324 (2006). 
53 JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS 589 (2006). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 593. 
56 Ibid., 599. 
57 Ibid.. 
58 Ibid. 
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law, even if it comes …. at the expense of sometimes elevation the rhetoric of states over their 
deeds.”59 That conclusion is fortified by the relatively rapid way in which the CCD was 
concluded. 
 
There is, of course, considerable difficulty in determining what custom is, but that problem will 
will undoubtedly be resolved over time through process. The CCD establishes a number of 
process mechanisms. The Convention is based on a “principle of international solidarity and 
cooperation” (CCD Art. 2); it establishes an obligation of consultation and coordination (CCD 
Art. 21); a biannual Conference of the Parties (CCD Art. 22) and an annual Intergovernmental 
Committee (CCD Art. 23). These are not exceptional in themselves. Many framework-type 
agreements contain similar provisions, but they do imply a commitment to work with the aim 
of cultural diversity more squarely in mind in future.     
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
An alternative to thinking about the CCD is to contemplate a world without a CCD-type 
instrument, and here it is clear that the pre-existing situation – one of little express protection 
for cultural diversity in the international trading regime – was inadequate. There was a sense of 
concern about the threat that untrammeled trade presented to cultural diversity. A deep vein of 
apprehension erupted in the form of the CCD, which now seeks to rebalance the landscape of 
international law. 
 
The lingering issue in the debate about shelf space, now transposed to the global stage, is what 
will be permitted and protected. And here North American experience is apposite because quite 
apart from the treaty’s validity as hard law – and we can legitimately wonder just how “hard” 
the law emanating from the CCD will ever be - the CCD is perhaps best placed to serve a 
“marker”, or sign, of something else. The contours of what that is, however, will remain 
undefined. Consequently, the CCD’s impact is likely to be diffuse and indirect. 
 
We also have to recognize that values of diversity are already recognized in existing WTO 
commitments, whether this is in the form of the exception for “public morals” or possibly 
human health. An ethos of respect for other interests is there. The aim of the trading system is 
not to debase the individual, to view him or her solely as homo economicus. It is to uplift 
people in order to ensure meaningful choice and to promote transformative possibilities so that 
life can be lived as it is envisioned in the U.N. Charter - that is, as “life in larger freedom”. The 
CCD should help to achieve this goal.  
                                                 
59 Ibid., p. 592. 
